MAY 26- JUNE 29, 1864--The Lynchburg Campaign.
No. 21.--Report of Brig. Gen. Alfred N. Duffié, U. S. Army, commanding First Cavalry Division.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this division from the 10th day of June, 1864, up to the present time:

Pursuant to paragraph 20, Special Orders, No. 112, headquarters Department of West Virginia, dated June 9, 1864, I took command of the First Cavalry Division, at Staunton, Va., June 9, 1864, relieving Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel. In accordance with orders from department headquarters of same date as above, I moved my division at 3 a.m. of June 10, 1864, on the Waynesborough pike toward Tye River Gap. I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Root, Fifteenth New York Cavalry, with two squadrons of that regiment to make a demonstration against. Waynesborough. He found their pickets six miles from the town, attacked and drove them into the place, where he found the enemy in force; drew the fire of their artillery, and aroused their whole camp. From prisoners subsequently captured, I ascertained that the whole rebel force at Waynesborough lay in line of battle for four hours, expecting a general attack from our army. Lieuten-ant-Colonel Root and his command manifested great gallantry in the execution of this movement. His losses were 1 killed and 1 missing. While Colonel Root was making the demonstration upon Waynesborough, I moved my command by a road to the right of the town, toward the Tye River Gap. My advance at about noon encountered the rear guard of Jackson's cavalry, capturing 1 prisoner. From him I learned that Jackson's command had just passed on the way to join Imboden at Waynesborough. Marching twenty-five miles this day. I encamped near the mountain in which <ar70_140> Tye River has its source. Lieutenant-Colonel Root joined me with his force near this place. Near this camp I caused to be burned an extensive furnace for the manufacture of pig-iron which had just been refitted to be used for the benefit of the rebel Government. From this camp I sent a communication to department headquarters at Midway, twenty-two miles distant. I also sent out two small parties across the mountains toward the railroad with orders to burn bridges and tear up the track. These parties, however, were unable to accomplish the object, the country being infested by the enemy.

On the morning of June 11, having awaited for some time to receive orders from department headquarters, I moved forward my command over the mountains and through Tye River Gap into the valley of the Tye River, leaving one regiment to picket the gap. From this point I again sent an officer, with an escort of fifteen men, bearing a communication to the major-general commanding the department. On the morning of this day having ascertained from a dispatch which was captured that a rebel wagon train, on its way from Staunton to Lynchburg, was moving some twelve miles ahead of my column, I sent forward a squadron, under Major Daniel, of Second Maryland Cavalry [First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry] to capture the train. He succeeded in overtaking the train, driving back the guards, and capturing a considerable number of wagons; also in capturing about 40 prisoners, including 7 commissioned officers, 3 of whom were rebel quartermasters. Major Daniel brought off some six or seven wagons, loaded with hams, flour, and other stores, but was obliged to destroy the remainder of the train, the horses having been taken off and the harness cut to pieces. From the quartermasters captured, I learned that property of very great value was destroyed in the train. About $800 in specie was destroyed in one wagon. Hundreds of thousands of Confederate money and bonds were burned, and all the books and papers belonging to the several quartermasters. One quartermaster remarked that the damage could only be estimated by millions. A considerable number of horses were also captured. On the afternoon of this day I sent a party of ten men and one sergeant from Captain Rennison's pioneers to destroy the railroad at Arrington. During the night they returned, having burned Arrington Depot, containing a large quantity of boots, shoes, and other quartermaster stores; also destroying four small bridges and tearing up the railroad for a distance of three or four miles. This work was very brilliantly executed by the sergeant in charge.

Failing to receive any communication from department headquarters or to ascertain the whereabouts of General Hunter's command, I moved forward my whole command on the morning of the 12th in the direction of Amherst Court-House, intending to strike the railroad near that place, destroy bridges and the track, and push a force across to the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, east of Lynchburg, with the purpose of destroying the railroad bridge over the James River about eight miles from Lynchburg. At about 10 a.m., when my column was five miles from the Court-House, I received General Hunter's communication, dated Lexington, June 11, and ordering me to report with my command at Lexington, with as little delay as possible. I immediately changed the direction of my column toward White's Gap. Arriving near the point where the road crosses Piney River, my advance encountered-a force of the enemy's cavalry, numbering some 300. I supported the advance <ar70_141> with two squadrons of the Twentieth Pennsylvania Cavalry, of Wynkoop's brigade, who charged the enemy, driving them back in confusion and capturing some 40 prisoners, among whom were 10 commissioned officers. Having driven the enemy beyond Piney River, and within three miles of Amherst Court-House, I moved up Piney River. From prisoners captured I ascertained that Imboden was near that place with his command, having moved from Rockfish Gap during the preceding night, on his way to Lynchburg. I proceeded up Piney River, thence via Buffalo Springs to White's Gap, which I occupied that night. When a few miles beyond Buffalo Springs I sent forward a squadron of cavalry to capture a train of refugee wagons. They succeeded in capturing a few wagons, but the horses had been cut loose from the wagons and the harness destroyed. The wagons were loaded with stores of provisions and forage, which was secured for my command. I occupied the gap at midnight, having marched thirty-five miles that day.

On the 13th I proceeded to Lexington, a distance of fifteen miles. The road over the mountain and through White's Gap is steep, rocky, and very difficult for artillery or a train. It was with great labor that I succeeded in taking my train through. Some seven miles from Lexington, near White's Gap, I destroyed about 2,000 cords of wood, which had been cut for manufacture into charcoal. I also burned an extensive furnace for the manufacture of pig-iron.

On the 14th I moved my division, according to orders from department headquarters, in rear of the whole army and train at 6 a.m.

During the 15th and 16th I marched in rear of the train. The march was very laborious. No opportunity was offered to obtain supplies from the country, and my command suffered greatly for want of forage. Very little opportunity for rest occurred, as our march for the most part was made during the night.

On the 17th of June, in accordance with orders from General Hunter, delivered to me by Brigadier-General Crook, I moved my command from the pike, by the road to the left, to the Forestville road. Proceeding a short distance on this road, I met the enemy at 1.30 p.m., strongly posted in the woods. I immediately engaged him, with my men dismounted in the woods. The road was narrow, and the woods so dense as to forbid the use of cavalry. The engagement of my division lasted about two hours, during which we drove the enemy a short distance. Mean time the infantry immediately on my right became engaged, and the firing was heavy along the whole line. The enemy fell back slowly. I followed with my command, halting for the night at Clay's Mills, about five miles from Lynchburg. I have not ascertained the exact loss of the division in the engagement of this day. My division lay at Clay's Mills in line of battle during this night.

On the morning of the 18th I moved my command slowly forward on the Forestville road, skirmishing with the enemy. I had sent several messengers during the night of the 17th to communicate with the major-general commanding, but had failed to receive any orders as to what I should do. At 9 a.m. I encountered the enemy at a bridge crossing the railroad some four miles from Lynchburg, and after a brisk encounter succeeded in dislodging them and driving them back. They partially destroyed the bridge before we drove them back. At 10.30 a.m. I received a communication from Brigadier-General Averell, stating that it was the desire of the commanding general that I should immediately move forward my division <ar70_142> and attack the enemy vigorously. I proceeded at once, moving my command in three columns, Colonel Taylor's brigade marching on the right of the road, Lieutenant Atkinson's section of horse artillery, supported by one regiment of cavalry, on the road, and Colonel Wynkoop's brigade on the left. A line of skirmishers was kept up on the front and flanks of the column. Upon moving forward my skirmishers encountered the enemy, drove them out of their temporary protection of rail barricades and pressed them back for two miles, until they sought refuge in their fortifications, beyond Blackwater bridge and within two miles of the city. Arriving at this place, my whole command was disposed in order of battle, and moved up to within less than half a mile of their fortifications, when my skirmishers came to the banks of the Blackwater, a deep and narrow stream with precipitous banks and swampy approaches. There was but one road by which a force could cross the stream, and this road was commanded by two of their strongest fortifications. The enemy were strongly posted on the opposite bank of the Blackwater, while they opened a heavy artillery fire upon my cavalry from their fortifications. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Atkinson to place his section of artillery in position. This he did, and poured such a destructive fire into the enemy's works commanding the bridge over the river as to silence their guns twice in succession. Simultaneously with this, I ordered a general advance of the line of skirmishers. The First New York (Lincoln) Cavalry, on the left of the line, was ordered to move briskly forward and drive back the enemy, which they did, crossing the stream; at the same time two squadrons of the Twentieth Pennsylvania Cavalry were ordered to charge the bridge. Attempting this, they were repulsed by a heavy fire from the enemy's infantry, which lay concealed beyond the bridge, while the enemy's guns again opened from all their works. On this night the Fifteenth New York Cavalry was ordered to make a demonstration upon the rebel works, but were repulsed by a large force of rebel infantry which lay concealed in the woods. These several demonstrations against the enemy by my right, left, and center developed the fact that the enemy were strongly posted, and in numbers much superior to my own. At the same time a heavy cloud of dust was observed on the left of my position, and careful observations discovered a considerable force of rebel cavalry moving in this direction. Colonel Wynkoop was ordered to send two squadrons from his command to hold them in check. This was successful, and the rebel cavalry were soon seen retreating toward the town. Subsequently, finding the enemy lapping around my right, I threw one regiment of cavalry from Taylor's brigade to the right to drive them back. This was accomplished. During the whole afternoon my whole line was constantly and warmly engaged with the enemy. At about 5 p.m. [he] opened along his whole line with artillery and small-arms, compelling my skirmishers to retire to the other bank of the river. From my position on the field I could see numerous re-enforcements marching down the hill from the city, and could hear the whistle of the cars as they came in and the playing of bands of music. This led me to the belief that large bodies of re-enforcements were arriving and being thrown into my front. About 7 p.m. an officer of General Averell's staff came to me upon the field and directed me to make a general advance of my line, stating that a brigade from General Crook's infantry division would come to my assistance on the right. A few moments afterward an <ar70_143> officer of Major-General Hunter's staff came to me, stating that the whole army was falling back, and that orders would be sent to me at what hour to fall back. I would here state that had I obeyed the orders brought by General Averell's aide, my loss must have been very great, if not my whole command sacrificed, as all my ammunition was exhausted and the enemy's forces massed in my front. Having held my position until 10 p.m., I took upon myself the responsibility of falling back. This was effected in perfect order, my forces being withdrawn in the same order in which I advanced in the morning. Falling back for three miles, I re-established my line of battle, in order to ascertain if the enemy were following. At the same time I sent Captain Ricker, of my staff, to the headquarters of General Hunter. He returned two hours later, informing me that he could not find General Hunter's headquarters, and that the whole army had left the field. I then fell back on the Forest road, crossing to the main pike at the village of New London. Some time later I overtook the rear of our retreating army, about daylight, after having fought about ten hours and marched all night. At a distance of four miles from Liberty Court-House I reported to the major-general commanding the army in person. I was then ordered to move to the advance of the main column and select camping-grounds for the several divisions composing the army. I encamped my division for two or three hours four miles beyond Liberty, when I received orders to move forward immediately and occupy Buford's Gap, some sixteen miles from Liberty Court-House.

My advance, under Colonel Wynkoop, occupied the gap 1 a.m. of the 20th of June. My whole division reached this point and encamped at daybreak. At this point I employed my whole force in tearing up and destroying the railroad. I destroyed the railroad, burning all the depots and bridges for a distance of ten miles. From Buford's Gap I received orders to proceed to Salem via Bonsack's. At this place I caused the depot to be burned and an extensive woolen factory which was engaged in the manufacture of clothing for the Confederate Government. I reached Salem at 2 a.m. of June 21.

On the morning of the 21st I was ordered by the major-general commanding the army to proceed to Catawba Mountain Gap, which was reported to be held by the enemy and strongly blockaded. My orders were to clear out this gap and take the tram through. This I did; I found about four miles of blockade, which was promptly removed and a small force of the enemy driven from the gap. Having passed the train over the mountain I received a signal dispatch from Captain Carlin, stating that the artillery was attacked and was without support. Though without any orders to support or picket the artillery I immediately sent one regiment back to the top of the mountain to assist the artillery, but the distance was too great for them to arrive in time to render any assistance.

At 7 p.m. of the 21st I was ordered to proceed, by way of New Castle Court-House, to the junction of the Fincastle and Sweet Springs roads, and there remain while the main army should pass. This I did, arriving at the point five miles beyond New Castle at daybreak of the 22d. With the First Brigade I placed strong pickets on all the reads to Fincastle and sent out scouting parties, whilst the Second Brigade was held in line of battle all of that day and the succeeding night. <ar70_144>

On the morning of the 23d I was ordered to proceed, via New Castle, in rear of the train and in rear of the rest of the army. From that time up to the arrival of my division at Loup Creek it has marched in the rear. No opportunity has been offered to obtain forage or subsistence for the men, everything having been taken by the troops marching in my front. As a consequence many of the men of my command have perished by the roadside from hunger and fatigue, whilst their horses fell by the way from the same cause. I would also respectfully call attention to the fact that my marching has been done principally during the night-time, thus affording very little opportunity for rest or sleep.